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Abstract
This paper presents a new rationale for delegation. In a repeated relationship, when
the principal gives up at time t the control over an action to the better informed agent,
the decision taken by the agent signals his private information to the principal. The
revelation of information is valuable to the principal only in a context of repeated rela-
tion where the principal can use the information at time t+1 to take another decision.
In this paper, we present an example where delegation occurs only if the relation lasts
for more than one period. In a single period context, if the agent has a bias in favor
of one project, he does not have incentives to select a project that is not his preferred
one; hence he does not disclose his private information and delegation is not valuable.
While in a repeated relationship, it becomes costly for the agent to keep the principal
non-informed and this counterbalances the agent’s bias for one project. Shared-control
(partial delegation) is then the preferred organizational structure when the interaction
is repeated. Moreover, shared-control dominates an alternative mechanism where the
principal centralizes all the decisions and the information is transfered through a mes-
sage game.
Introduction
Economics of organizations concentrate on the design of incentive schemes to align the
interests of the organizations’ members and to promote the organizations’ goals. Beyond
∗E-mail address: gautier@core.ucl.ac.be., Address for correspondence: CORE Voie du Roman Pays 34,
B1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium.
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explicit monetary incentives such as performance related to pay scheme, the organization
of the decision making process is by itself part of the incentive package. In particular,
giving power to a subordinate affects the global performance of an organization. In this
paper, we present a model that compares two organizational structures: delegation where
the subordinate receives power from his supervisor and centralization where the supervisor
retains the power. Obviously, when the subordinate has authority, the supervisor tries to
limit the discretion of the delegate, especially when it is known that the delegates does not
share the preferences of his supervisor. We explore a model where decisions should be
repeatedly taken. In this case, the supervisor limits the power of the agent by allowing him
to take a limited number of decisions. Delegation is then a shared control situation where
the power is split between the two parties. We show that delegation to a subordinate even
with biased preferences, could be the preferred organizational structure and lead to the first
best outcome.
Model overview and results
This paper considers the problem of task delegation under asymmetric information. An
organization composed of a supervisor (the principal, she) and a subordinate (the agent,
he) should repeatedly select investment projects. The subordinate has superior information
about the best project choice and he does not share the objectives of his supervisor who
acts in the interest of the organization. The agent is biased toward some types of projects.
In particular, there is one project that gives a larger private benefit to the agent. Such a
divergence of interests between the two parties arises for example when the agent has a
preference for empire and prefers to manage a larger firm (Jensen, 1986) or when a specific
project leaves a larger private benefit to the agent.
To introduce delegation, we follow the incomplete contract literature1 and assume that
the principal and the agent cannot contract on the agent’s private information and on the
decisions.2 However, control over the action is contractible. The project’s choice is then
a transferable control action3: an action than cannot be contracted for, neither ex-ante nor
ex-post, but for which the control could be transferred. The contract signed between the
principal and the agent then specifies who has the right to select the investment project at
time t. Delegation in this context refers to a situation where the agent receives the control.
In a single period context, delegation of the project’s choice to the agent entails a loss
of control. Delegation is costly because the agent does not share the preferences of his
supervisor. When the agent receives the control, he selects his preferred investment project
ignoring the consequences on the principal’s welfare. However, the benefit of an informed
decider could countervail the loss of control. Despite the cost, it might still be efficient to
delegate because the agent has superior information. The choice of delegating the task to the
agent depends on the trade-off between the loss of control when the agent decides and the
loss of information when the principal decides (Dessein, 2002). When the principal retains
control, there is no bias in the decision but the principal is not or imperfectly informed.
1Tirole (1999).
2Contractibility would make the problem a standard adverse selection problem.
3Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey, (2002).
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Under centralization, the agent could transmit part of his hidden information through non
contractible messages.
In a two-period context, where the organization invests repeatedly in projects, there is
an additional benefit of delegation: it becomes a way to transfer information from the agent
to the principal. Delegation is efficient when the control over decisions is shared between
the agent and the principal: the agent selects the project at time t, the principal at time
t+1. Moreover, by observing the agent’s decision, the principal learns (part of) the agent’s
hidden information. With shared control, the principal becomes informed if the agent’s
decision is contingent on his private information.
If, in the one period model, the agent always selects his preferred project, replicating
this strategy in a repeated relationship is costly for the agent. When the agent always selects,
whatever his private information, the same decision at t, the principal does not acquire
information. Selecting his preferred project at t is costly if the decision of a non-informed
principal at t + 1 hurts the agent. Hence, the agent might not select his preferred project
in the period one, in order to signal his private information to the principal. In this case,
delegation is valuable as it implies a transfer of information from the agent to the principal
(Gautier and Paolini, 2002).
Moreover, if the agent does not take a decision contingent on his private information, the
principal is weakly better off if she retains control as she could replicate the agent’s choice.
The revelation of information is not only a property of delegation in repeated context, it is
also a necessary condition for delegation to occur.4
The contribution of this paper is to give an example where delegation is not valuable in
a single period context, but is valuable when the interaction is repeated. This example il-
lustrates that in repeated relationships, delegation is valuable for the principal only because
she acquires the agent’s hidden information. Delegation is also preferred to an alterna-
tive mechanism where the agent transfers his private information through message and the
principal then decides. Communication in the alternative mechanism is not complete: the
principal imperfectly learns the agent’s information. Hence, the principal prefers to learn
the information by giving up control.
Related literature
In the standard principal agent theory, following the revelation principle (Myerson,
1982), delegation is always weakly dominated by a grand contract between the principal
and all the agents. To speak about delegation in a principal agent setting, one needs to re-
lax some assumption of the revelation principle. Melumad, Mookherjee and Reichelstein
(1992) relax the assumption of perfect communication between the principal and the agents.
When information transmission is noisy, delegation to one agent reduces the need of com-
munication and improves the organization performance despite the divergence of interests
between both parties. Laffont and Martimort (1998) assume that communication between
the principal and the agents is imperfect and that side contracting between agents is feasible.
4Gautier and Paolini (2002) use the properties of signaling games to show that when the agent receives
control, the decision he takes signals his private information i.e. the signaling game has a (unique) separating
equilibrium.
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When several agents have the possibility to collude against the principal, partial delegation
to one agent reduces the stake of collusion.
Aghion and Tirole (1997), Dessein (2002), Ottaviani (2000), Gautier and Paolini (2002)
and this paper assume that the contracts are incomplete. Incomplete contracting refers to
situations where some variables cannot be part of the contract. A variable cannot be con-
tracted upon, when it cannot be verified by a party outside the contracting relation (a court
or a judge for example). If a third party cannot verify that a task has been correctly per-
formed by an employee (and the circumstances under which this task has been performed),
the contract governing the employer-employee relationship cannot specify a pay contingent
on the achievement of this specific task. Non verifiability by outsiders could come from a
prohibitive cost of writing a detailed contract. If the task performed by the employee has
multiple dimensions, describing all of them in a contract would be extremely costly. More-
over, verifying if the task has been performed adequately would be even more costly. A
prohibitive cost of writing detailed contracts is a justification for the incomplete contract
hypothesis (Tirole, 1999).
A large part of the theory of organizations is built on the incomplete contract hypothesis.
Explaining delegation, in particular, often relies on the hypothesis that the tasks performed
by the delegate cannot be described in a comprehensive contracting framework.5 In the
incomplete contract models, delegation is associated with an effective control over the de-
cisions: the delegate has the freedom to pick any action from an allowed set. While in a
complete contract framework, even if the agent performs a task himself, he does not have
any authority since everything has been specified in the contract.6
Dessein (2002) considers a one period principal agent relationship where both parties
disagree on a project choice. The agent has a systematic bias and prefers larger projects than
the principal. The relation takes place under asymmetric information. The agent has a piece
of private information: he knows a state of the world parameter that the principal ignores.
The state of the world determines the optimal project (for both the principal and the agent).
Project choice and the state of the world parameter cannot be contracted upon, hence, the
only feasible contract is to decide who decides. When the principal delegates the project
choice to the agent, delegation is costly since a biased agent selects a project that is not the
principal’s preferred one. Because of the agent’s bias, delegation is associated with a loss
of control. However, the agent is better informed and this countervails the loss of control.
If the principal retains control and asks the agent to advise her about the project choice,
communication by the agent is imperfect i.e. he does not truthfully report the state of the
world. Communication associated with a centralized decision by the principal is a cheap
talk game. Following the Cheap Talk literature (Crawford and Sobel, 1982), communication
is noisy. Hence, the principal will not acquire the agent’s private information with a message
game and communication is associated with a loss of information. Delegation dominates
5Roider (2003) is an exception. In his model, a simple delegation of authority is a solution to a complete-
contracting problem with contractible actions both ex-ante and ex-post and unlimited transfer payments.
6Aghion and Tirole (1997) distinguish formal and real authority. Formal authority is conferred by contract
or ownership, but it does not necessarily confer real authority that is effective control.
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when the loss of control is lower than the loss of information. In other words, delegation
is efficient when loss of control are relatively small, that is when the agent’s bias is not too
large.
Ottaviani (2000) also compares delegation to a better informed agent with strategic
communication. He shows that reducing the agent’s discretion by limiting his possible
choices to a subset of the possible decisions increases the principal’s utility. The reason
is that reducing the agent’s discretion countervails the agent’s bias toward some types of
projects and hence decreases the associated loss of control. Roider (2003) has a similar
point: restricting the agent’s discretion is meant to rule out extreme choices and thereby
improves the organization performance. Armstrong (1994) considers the case where the
agent has a multi-dimensional private information. The principal ignores both the prefer-
ences of the agent and the state of the world. Delegation with reduced agent’s discretion is
also the optimal organizational structure.
Gautier and Paolini (2002) and Legros (1993) study delegation in a two period model.
In both papers, delegation is a learning process: by giving up control to the better informed
agent in the first period, the principal learns part of the agent’s private information. If in a
single period model like Dessein (2002), the agent selects his preferred project whenever
he receives control, it is not so when the interaction is repeated. In a multi-period relation,
the decisions taken at the earlier stages have an informational content. The principal ac-
quires information by observing the actions of the better informed delegate. Hence, when
he chooses his action, the agent takes into account that his decision signals his private in-
formation to the other party. Delegation is then a signaling game between the agent and the
principal (Spence, 1973). The first mover, the delegate, takes a decision based on his private
information. Then, the principal observes the decision, revises her prior beliefs about the
agent’s hidden information and takes a second period decision. Delegation in first period
becomes a signaling game only if the interaction is repeated. This is the main difference
between repeated and single period models: it is only in the first case that the decision of the
agent is strategic. When the relation lasts for one period only, the agent selects his preferred
project whenever he has received the control. When the relation is multi-period, the agent
trades off the immediate benefit of taking his preferred decision with the potential adverse
effect it could have on the principal’s information.
Legros (1993) considers the following problem: a politician delegates a policy choice
to a delegate (a state agency for example) with unknown preferences. After observing the
choice of the delegate, the politician either re-elects the same delegate or selects another
delegate from the initial set. Legros (1993) shows that the agent partially hides his private
information, in order to increase his probability of being selected as a delegate at the next
period. If a delegate is too extreme in the first period, he has very little chance of being
the next period delegate, hence he prefers to hide his information in the first period and he
mimics less extreme delegates. The equilibrium in the signaling game is a partial pooling
equilibrium. Second period delegation is used as a disciplining device. Even though the
decisions cannot be contracted upon, the agent might be rewarded (or punished) for not
being too extreme in first period by receiving control in second period too.
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Gautier and Paolini (2002) consider the problem of Dessein (2002) in a repeated con-
text. They analyze the equilibrium of the following signaling game: at a first stage, a better
informed agent takes a decision, then, the principal observes the first decision and takes
another decision. The agent has a bias toward larger projects and both decisions affect the
welfare of the two parties. When there is a continuum of possible projects, delegation in
the first period leads to a complete transfer of information if the state of the world can take
two values. It means that the agent acts differently in the two states and the principal learns
the true state of the world by observing the agent’s decision. With more than two possible
states of the world values, the equilibrium is not always separating (the agent could take the
same action in two different states) but delegation always improves the prior knowledge of
the principal. In technical terms, it means that the full pooling equilibrium where the agent
selects the same decision in all states of the world does not exist. The results of Gautier
and Paolini (2002) rely on the use of refinements of the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium and in
particular the Cho and Kreps (1987) intuitive criterion.
This paper studies a similar problem in a simplified framework where the number of
possible projects is limited. In this case, delegation to the agent is not always informative.
The principal does not acquire any information if the relation lasts for a single period. With
two periods, the principal learns information only if the agent’s bias is not too large. It is
only when the relation is repeated for a sufficiently long period that delegation is always
informative.
Aghion and Tirole (1997) consider a problem where the information structure is en-
dogenous. Both the principal and the agent have to perform an effort to learn information
about potential projects. After the learning stage, a decision is taken either by the principal
or the agent according to the contract. The incentive to acquire information increases when
the party receives more control. For example, the agent has more incentives to be informed
if he has both formal and real authority meaning that there is no threat that the principal
overrules the agent’s decision.
Aghion et al. (2002, 2004) show that a shared control over two decisions enhances
cooperation between the parties. Two parties can either cooperate or not. If they do not
cooperate, the party that has control implements his preferred project. In a shared control
situation where the principal takes the first decision and the agent the second, the two parties
prefer to cooperate as none of them could implement his preferred project. Cooperation
could be achieved only if the control is shared. Similarly in this paper, shared control
between the principal and the agent is meant to achieve information transfer from the better
informed agent to the principal.
Applications
To illustrate our model, consider the following two examples:
Example 1: Manager-Shareholders relationship. Managers are supposed to act in the
interests of the shareholders. However, since Berle and Means (1932), it is commonly
agreed that ownership (shareholders) and control (managers) have different objectives. In
practice, shareholders often transfer the effective control over the firm to the managers and
rubber stamp most of the manager’s main decisions. A reason for that is the managerial
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superior information about the firm and its environment. Contracts usually fail to reconcile
the interests of the two parties. Thereby, to maximize the firm’s value, shareholders have
to decide which decisions they do leave to managers and which decisions they keep in
hand. Whether or not shareholders rubber stamp the managerial decision depends on the
information they have, and presumably the available information depends on the managerial
past actions. For example, if the manager decides to acquire another firm in a new business
segment, shareholders will allow the manager to diversify the firm as they do not have the
necessary information. But, if the manager suggests additional acquisitions in the same
field, shareholders have at that time more information to assess on benefits of such a merger
and will exercise more control on this second merger decision. This shared control situation
with information transfer is precisely what we describe in this paper.
Example 2: Advisors: Many organizations such as firms, governments or international
organizations delegate research to experts like consulting firms or universities while they
have resources to produce it. We can explain such a delegation by the fact that even if
the consulting firms and/or universities have a different objective from those of the govern-
ment (for example valuable academic research vs support to decisions), they have a better
knowledge of the ’state of research’ in some particular field. Part of this expertise is trans-
mitted through the research output and the deciders can use it as a basis for their subsequent
research that can be oriented more toward support to decisions.
The Model
We consider an organization composed of a principal and an agent. The organization should
select an investment project that affects the welfare of both members.
There are three possible investment projects. One, denoted by S, is a safe project, the
two others, denoted R1 and R2, are risky. The projects’ characteristics (risk and return)
are common knowledge. The project yielding the highest return, however, depends on the
underlying economic environment. We represents this environment by a state of the world
parameter θ which belongs to a set Θ ≡ {θ1, θ2}. Only the agent knows the true value of θ,
but it is common knowledge that Pr(θ = θ1) = η1 and Pr(θ = θ2) = η2 = 1− η1.
Asymmetric information is a key feature of organizations. Under full information, there
is no reason to delegate the project’s choice to the agent7; it is only because the agent is bet-
ter informed that delegation could be valuable. There are plenty of examples of asymmetric
information in organizations. In manager-shareholders relationship, the firm’s manager,
as an insider, has access to information that shareholders do not have. In multi-division
firms, divisional managers, due to their greater proximity with their market, have private
information about products, markets and investment opportunities. In employer-employee
relationship, the employee acquires through on the job learning information that the em-
ployer does not have.
7Except for Zabojnik (2002) who finds that delegation may be optimal even if the principal is better able
to choose a project. This results comes from the hypothesis that the agent’s effort and the accuracy of project
choice are complements.
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Asymmetric information is not problematic by itself. If the information could be ef-
ficiently transmitted to the decision maker, delegation is again useless. Information will
not flow efficiently within the organization when either proceeding information is costly or
noisy8 or when the members of the organization have conflicting objectives. In fact, there is
no reason to assume that all the members of an organization share the same preferences. For
example, in the manager shareholders relation, the manager does not necessarily selects the
investment project that maximizes the shareholders’ wealth. There are plenty of evidence
that managers have preferences for empires. When shareholders want to maximize firms’
value, managers have incentives to cause their firms to grow beyond the optimal size.9 In
this article, we will assume that in addition to asymmetric information, the principal and
the agent disagree over the best project choice.
The returns of the risky projects depend on the economic environment θ while the safe
project S has a return independent of θ. Whatever the state of the world, the safe project
returns s > 0. The risky projects can either succeed or fail. When a project succeeds, it
returns v > s and it returns nothing when it fails. The probabilities that a project succeeds
or fails depend on the state of the world θ.
The project Ri succeeds in state θi with a probability p and fails with the corresponding
probability (1 − p). In the other state θj , the probability of success of project Ri is q.
We assume that project Ri is more likely to succeed in state θi than in state θj : p > q.
Conversely, failure of project Ri is more likely when θ = θj : (1 − q) > (1 − p). The
expected return of a risky project Ri is pv in state θi and qv < pv in state θj .
We assume that in state θi, project Ri has the highest expected return and project Rj
the lowest one:
Assumption 1: pv > s > qv.
The principal is supposed to be risk neutral. We assume that the utility is tied to the ex-
pected project return. Shareholders, for example, collect the final value of the firm. Hence,
risk neutral shareholders want the firm to select the project with the highest expected return.
We denote by UP (y, θ) the principal’s utility in state θ when project y ∈ {S,R1, R2}
is implemented. Assumption 1 implies that in state θ1, the principal’ utility is such that:
UP (R1, θ1) > UP (S, θ1) > UP (R2, θ1) (1)
Similarly, assumption 1 also implies that in state θ2, the UP (., θ2) is such that:
UP (R2, θ2) > UP (S, θ2) > UP (R1, θ2) (2)
If the principal is unaware of the true state of the world but only knows its prior distri-
bution (η1, η2), we assume that her preferred project is the safe project:
Assumption 2: For i = 1, 2: s > ηipv + (1− ηi)qv.
8Radner (1993) and Melumad et al. (1992).
9Jensen (1986).
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Assumption 2 implies that for i, j = 1, 2:
UP (S, θi) > ηiUP (Ri, θi) + ηjUP (Ri, θj) (3)
Hereafter we will refer to the first best situation when the principal manages to imple-
ment the project Ri in state θi.
The agent derives a private benefit that depends on the realized state of the world and the
project’s choice. The agent’s preferences do not correspond with those of the principal. The
agent has a systematic bias in favor of one project, say project R1. We interpret the agent’s
bias as follows: there is one project that systematically leaves larger private benefits to the
agent. These benefits could be for example, a higher visibility and thereby larger future
employment (and pay) prospects, project R1 could be easier to achieve for the manager due
to a specific human capital linked to this project or the private benefits is simply on the job
consumption.
Hence, in state θ1, the agent’s preferences correspond with those of the principal since
they both prefer project R1. Moreover, we assume that in state θ1, the worst project for the
agent is R2.
If UA(y, θ) represents the agent’s utility in state θ when project y ∈ {S,R1, R2} is
implemented, we have the following preference relation in state θ1:
UA(R1, θ1) > UA(S, θ1) > UA(R2, θ1) (4)
In the other state θ2, due to the large private benefit, the agent’s preferred project is R1.
But the next best choice of the agent is the principal’s preferred project:
UA(R1, θ2) > UA(R2, θ2) > UA(S, θ2) (5)
For the agent, the preferred project is R1 in both states. What changes from state to
state is the worst project.
The agent is assumed to be liquidity constrained. Otherwise, the problem would have a
simple solution where the agent buys the firm from the principal for a fixed upfront payment.
Delegation matters only if there is no complete contract governing the relation between
the principal and the agent. Indeed, if it is possible to contract on the economic environ-
ment and on the actions, the following revelation mechanism where the principal designs a
contract which associate to any report of the agent the corresponding action and payments
leads to the first best project choice. However, it is costly for the principal since she has to
transfer money to the agent. Hence, our non contractibility assumption is equivalent to a
liquidity constraint for the principal.
We suppose that the state of the world parameter θ and the project choice cannot be con-
tracted for, neither ex-ante nor ex-post. However control over the decision is contractible.
The project choice is then a transferable control action (Aghion et al., 2002)
Last, note that complete contract would not always be useful when the interaction is
repeated because the principal will manage to implement the first best with a delegation
contract. Before analyzing the repeated interaction model, we analyze a single period inter-
action.
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Delegation and Communication in a Single Period Relationship
Suppose that the principal-agent relationship lasts for a single period. In this framework,
there are two possible contracts: (1) A-Control: the principal delegates the project’s choice
to the agent and (2) P-Control: the principal retains control and chooses the project. Under
P-Control, the agent could communicate information before the principal decides. Mes-
sages are not contractible. Hence, communication under P-Control is a recommendation or
an advice from the agent to the principal.
If the principal transfers control to the agent, the latter selects the project knowing the
state of the world parameter θ. Given the contract incompleteness, the agent cannot be
rewarded or punished for his project choice. Thereby, in each state of the world, he selects
the project which brings the largest payoff. When θ = θ1, the agent’s preferred project is
R1. When θ = θ2, the agent’s preferred project is R1 too (by assumption). Hence, under
A-Control, project R1 is selected in both states θ1 and θ2.
Given that under A-Control, the agent’s choice is independent of his private informa-
tion, the principal is weakly better-off if she retains the control. Indeed, the principal could
replicate the agent’s choice under P-Control.
However, under P-Control, the principal will not select the risky project R1, as the agent
would do, but rather the safe project S. Ignoring the value of θ, the principal has a higher
payoff if she selects the safe project. In a single period relation, facing a better informed
subordinate is not sufficient to delegate the control because the agent has a bias in favor of
one project. The agent’s private information is not sufficient to make delegation valuable.10
Under P-Control, the principal could construct an alternative mechanism where she asks
the agent to send a message before she selects a project. The principal and the agent plays
a message game before the principal decides on the project. Following our assumption on
the impossibility to base contracts on the state of the world realization, the agent cannot be
rewarded nor punished for sending a ”wrong” message. This kind of message game is a
cheap talk game11 where the informed agent sends a possibly noisy message based on his
private information to the principal. Unlike the Spence (1973) signaling game, it costs the
agent nothing to send a message.
Since the state of the world can only take two values, we analyze without loss of gen-
erality a cheap talk game where the agent could send two possible messages. We call them
m1 and m2. Message m1 (resp. m2) means that the agent advises the principal that the sate
of the world is θ1 (resp. θ2).
Suppose that, whatever the agent is doing in state θ2, the agent sends the message m1
in state θ1. Indeed, it is in the interest of the agent in state θ1 is to send a single message
to inform the principal that the state of the world is θ1. In the other state θ2, if the agent
also sends a single message (m2 in this case), the principal learns the true value of θ and
she implements the first best. By transferring the true information, the agent is better off in
10In Dessein (2002), there is not a single project preferred in all states but an agent bias for projects larger
than the principal’s preferred one. In this context, if the principal delegates, there is a trade-off between the size
of the bias and the benefits of an informed decider and delegation could be optimal in the single-period model.
11Crawford and Sobel (1982).
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both states compared to the non-informed principal case where the safe project is always
implemented.
But in state θ2 the agent can increase his utility further by randomizing over the two
possible messages. Consider the following strategy: in state θ2, the agent sends the message
m1 with probability σ and m2 with probability (1 − σ). In state θ1, the agent selects
the message m1 with probability 1. When the principal observes the message m2, she
is sure that θ = θ2 and then she selects the project R2. When the principal observes
m1, she revises her prior beliefs (using the Baye’s rule). After receiving the message m1,
the principal’s beliefs over the states of the world are: Prob(θ = θ1|m1) = η1η1+ση2 and




UP (R1, θ1) +
ση2
η1 + ση2
UP (R1, θ2) ≥ UP (S, θ) (6)
Otherwise, the principal selects the safe project after observing m1.
Condition (6) will be satisfied for σ sufficiently small. Therefore, for the agent in state
θ2, it is optimal to select the highest probability σ∗ such that (6) is satisfied with equality.
This optimal value σ∗ is strictly positive given that (i) the left-hand side of (6) is decreasing
in σ and (ii) for σ = 0, (6) is satisfied. With this strategy, the payoff of the agent in state θ2
is
(1− σ∗)UA(R2, θ2) + σ∗UA(R1, θ2) > UA(R2, θ2) (7)
The agent in state θ1 cannot improve his utility by sending other combinations of the
two messages, hence his equilibrium strategy is to always send message m1.
The equilibrium in the message game involves randomization in state θ2. It implies that
the principal does not learn the true information. With cheap-talk game, the principal im-
proves his knowledge of the unknown parameter θ but his information remains incomplete.
This result is standard in cheap talk games (Crawford and Sobel, 1982). Under P-Control,
the agent introduces noise in his message and the principal is not able to implement the first
best.
Like in Dessein (2002) and Ottaviani (2000), there is a loss of control under A-Control
and a loss of information under P-Control. However, in our framework A-Control is never
optimal.
Delegation and Communication in Repeated Relationship
If, in the context of this model, delegation is not valuable in a single period, this section
demonstrates that the principal could achieve the first best with a delegation contract when
the relation is repeated twice. If instead of selecting a single investment project, suppose
the organization invests repeatedly in projects. We consider a twice repeated version of the
single period model. In period one, the organization selects a first investment project within
{S,R1, R2}, and in period two, a second investment project is chosen within the same set.
There is no reason to assume that the organization should select the same project in both
periods but we suppose that a common state of the world parameter applies for these two
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periods.12 Given that θ is time invariant, the first best choice implies that the same project
would be selected in both periods. In particular, the first best is to implement project R1
(resp R2) in both periods when the state of the world is θ1 (resp. θ2). A change of project
would mean that new information has become available before the organization selects the
second project i.e. the project selected in first place was the wrong project.
Before the first period, the principal decides who will be in charge of the project choices.
It means that the principal allocates the control over the projects before the first project
choice.
The payoffs associated with the each project are described in equations (1) to (5). With
a discount factor δ ≤ 1, the choice of projects y1 and y2 in periods one and two in state θ
brings about a utility such that : Uk(y1, θ) + δUk(y2, θ), k = A,P .
Without communication, like in the basic model, if the principal keeps control over the
two decisions (P-Control), she does not acquire information about the true state of the world
and therefore, she selects twice the safe project. Similarly, if the agent receives the control
over the two decisions (A-Control), he chooses twice the risky project R1. Hence, like in
the one period model, there is no reason to give full control to the agent in the repeated
context since the principal could replicate the agent’s choices.
But, when the interaction is repeated, the contracting possibilities extend and the control
could also be shared between the principal and the agent. In a Shared-Control situation,
where the agent selects the first investment project and the principal selects the second, the
principal can acquire information by observing the agent’s choice. Indeed, if the princi-
pal transfers the control, and if the agent invests differently in the two states, the principal
learns the agent’s private information by observing the project choice. The Shared-Control
situation is a signaling game: the first mover (the agent) takes a decision that signals infor-
mation to the principal who then revises her prior beliefs about the state of the world when
taking the second decision. However, opposed to the cheap talk game, signaling the state
of the world through the project choice is not cheap anymore.
Consider the choice of the agent in state θ1. With Shared-Control, the agent’s payoff
associated with the choice of his preferred project R1 in period one depends on the choice
in the other state. If the agent also selects the preferred project R1 in state θ2, his payoff is
UA(R1, θ1) + δUA(S, θ1). Alternatively if the agent selects a project in {R2, S} in state
θ2, his payoff is (1 + δ)UA(R1, θ1) since the choice of R1 now signals to the principal that
the state of the world is θ1.
If instead of selecting project R1, the agent selects his second preferred project S, the
highest payoff for the agent is: UA(S, θ1) + δUA(R1, θ1) when the choice of S signals
that the state is θ1. If we compare the lowest payoff when the agent chooses R113 with the
12This assumption is standard in dynamic incentive contract models (Laffont and Tirole, 1988). For our argu-
ment, we only need that the state of the world parameters are correlated in both periods, so that the information
learned in the first period could be used in the second period.
13The lowest payoff is considered to be the case for which the principal does not acquire information after
observing R1. Payoffs would have been lower if the principal associates with the choice of R1 posterior beliefs
such that Pr(θ = θ1 | R1) = 0. We discuss the robustness of these beliefs later.
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highest payoff when hechooses S, the best choice for the agent is R1 if:
UA(R1, θ1) + δUA(S, θ1) ≥ UA(S, θ1) + δUA(R1, θ1)
⇔ (1− δ)UA(R1, θ1) ≥ (1− δ)UA(S, θ1) (8)
which is true given equation (4) for all δ ≤ 1. Hence, in state θ1, the agent has a dominant
strategy R1.
Consider next the choice of the agent in state θ2. If the agent selects his preferred project
R1, the principal does not acquire information, as we just established that the agent always
selects the project R1 in state θ1. In a Shared-Control situation, the choice of R1 in state
θ2 gives a payoff equals to: UA(R1, θ2) + δUA(S, θ2). If,instead of selecting his preferred
project, the agent selects the second preferred project R2, the principal learns the true state
of the world after observing the agent’s decision since the agent takes different decisions
in the two states. The project choice then signals the state of the world to the principal
and the principal, which is now informed, selects her preferred project in period two. With
Shared-Control, thechoice of R2 by the agent in the first period is followed by a choice of
R2 by the principal and the agent’s associated payoff is: (1 + δ)UA(R2, θ2).
In state θ2, the agent prefers to disclose his information (choosing project R2) than
hiding it (choosing project R1) if:
(1 + δ)UA(R2, θ2) ≥ UA(R1, θ2) + δUA(S, θ2) (9)
or differently if:
δ(UA(R2, θ2)− UA(S, θ2)) ≥ UA(R1, θ2)− UA(R2, θ2) (10)
The agent discloses his private information if the benefit of an informed principal in
period two (the left hand side of (10)) is larger than the cost of informing the principal (the
right hand side of (10)). To inform the principal, the agent renounces to select his preferred
project, hence he incurs a cost.
Hence, in a Shared-Control situation, in state θ2, the agent selects project R2 if condi-
tion (9) holds and project R1 otherwise.
Compared to the basic model, there is now a benefit associated with delegation: the prin-
cipal learns the agent’s hidden information if (9) holds. Hence delegating the first project
choice to the agent could become valuable. Repeating the interaction modifies the agent’s
choice in state θ2.
The signaling game under Shared-Control has another separating equilibrium where in
state θ1 the agent selects S and in state θ2, he selects R1 if:
UA(S, θ1) + δUA(R1, θ1) ≥ UA(R1, θ1) + δUA(R2, θ1)
But this second equilibrium is Pareto dominated. Moreover, it does not survive the Cho
and Kreps (1987) intuitive criterion.14
14Gautier and Paolini (2002) use the intuitive criterion to show that delegation always implies an information
transfer when there are two states of the world and the set of feasible projects is a continuous interval.
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Proposition 1 If condition (9) holds, the principal shares the control with the agent and
the first best is implemented. If (9) does not hold, the principal retains control.
In a single period context, the principal never delegates the project choice to the agent;
when the interaction is repeated, transferring the control to the agent is valuable if the
controlling party (the agent) transfers information to the non-informed party (the principal).
Information is transferred, despite the agent’s bias in favor of one project, when the loss
associated with keeping the principal ignorant is large compared to the loss associated with
canceling the choice of the preferred project to signal the hidden information. Sharing
control creates incentives for the agent to disclose his private information. Note also that
if there is no information transfer, the principal retains control. Information transfer is a
new rationale for delegation but also a necessary condition for shared-control in a repeated
relationship.
Like in the one period model, a mechanism in which the principal centralizes and relies
on a message from the agent fails to inform the principal. Again, the agent randomizes his
message in state θ2. Hence, this alternative mechanism brings about a lower utility if (9)
holds, but improves the principal’s decisions if she retains control.
If the relationship lasts for T > 2 periods, the incentives to disclose information under
shared control increase. Indeed, in a T times repeated interaction, there is an immediate
benefit of hiding information in state θ2, but there is a future cost: for the T − 1 remaining
periods, the principal remains non informed and implements the safe project. Repeating the
interaction then increases the cost of keeping the principal ignorant (the left hand side of
(10) increases) . Thereby, for T sufficiently large, the equilibrium in the signaling is always








The left hand side is the agent’s utility when he signals that θ = θ2 by taking selecting
the project R2, the right hand side is the agent’s utility when he hides his information in the
first period and let the principal takes the safe project in the remaining periods. Clearly, for
large values of T , the condition is always satisfied.
Conclusions
In this paper, we show that delegation in repeated relationship is efficient only when the
supervisor improves his knowledge of the unknown state of the world parameter. The prin-
cipal gives up the control to the agent when she can learn the agent’s private information.
Without learning, delegation in repeated relations is valueless. Information acquisition is
then a new rationale for delegation.
In the single period model, the agent does not use his private information and the prin-
cipal then does not hand over control. The repetition of the interaction creates incentives
for the agent to disclose his private information. It is because the agent may suffer from the
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ignorance of the principal that he has incentives to disclose his private information when
receiving control.
The paper presents a simple example where delegation does not occur in a single period
model but is the preferred organizational structure when the relation lasts several periods. In
our example, the principal can implement her preferred project in both periods with shared
control. Hence delegation does not cost anything for the principal. In more complicated
frameworks like Dessein (2002) or Gautier and Paolini (2002), under delegation, the agent
does not select the principal’s preferred project and a loss of control results from delegation.
But delegation in repeated relationships remains valuable only if the principal improves
his knowledge of the state of the world parameter by observing the agent’s decision. A
necessary condition for delegation is then the existence of a separating equilibrium in the
signaling game when the agent controls the first decision.15 A separating equilibrium exists
if the utility function satisfies the single-crossing property.16
Delegation is robust when we consider an alternative mechanism, compatible with the
partial contracting set-up, where the principal centralizes all the decisions and the agent
communicates a message before the principal decides. In this mechanism, communication
is cheap-talk game. The equilibrium in cheap-talk is usually not separating (Crawford and
Sobel, 1982, Dessein, 2002). Hence, the principal is not completely informed with the
cheap-talk game, whereas he is fully informed with delegation if the equilibrium is separat-
ing.
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